YES WE CAN SAVE HOMES!
Thursday, February 19, 2009 at 11:43AM
In high school, my AP Lang professor had a quote on her wall; it read something to the effect of, "how do I know what I think about something until I read what I say about it." The best part about having a blog is that I can write down what I think, and try to make sense of it after reading it. This is my attempt to do that with respect to Obama's housing initiative that was revealed yesterday:
Surprisingly, the plan doesn't suck. The financial incentives for the lender and the borrower to modify the loan and then timely service the debt are promising. I've separated my thoughts pursuant to the three different aspects of the plan
FIRST
Some quick facts about the plan for delinquent borrowers or those that are at imminently at risk of defaulting:
- Banks are encouraged to modify delinquent loans. They are given $1000 each time they successfully modify a loan, and $1000 for each year (for up to 3 years) if the borrower stays current on the loan. There is a greater incentive to modify a loan where the borrower is imminently at risk of defaulting as compared to a loan where the borrower has already defaulted.
- In order to successfully modify a loan, the plans calls for banks to reduce the monthly payment of the borrower to 38% of the borrower's monthly income. After that, the government and lender, together, will subsidize a reduction of monthly payments (by lowering interest rates) even further - to 31% of monthly gross income.
- Delinquent borrowers can get $1000 in principal reductions for 5 years if they stay current on their modified loan
I'm not positive about the definition of "successfully modify a loan" though, so don't quote me on it. The details of the plan in the WSJ are a bit sketchy, and to some extent, I assumed they meant what I wrote since they scattered the details of the plan over 4 different articles. But, as always, I think I'm right.
I like this plan for delinquent borrowers because it:
- Encourages lenders and borrowers to modify the terms of the loan on their own, and it keeps the borrower in the home.
- Keeping the borrower in the home will reduce the inventory of homes that are on the market currently, and ultimately, put an end to falling (and possibly a start to rising) home prices. To the extent that falling home prices is the root of the credit crisis (banks are not lending and have substantial losses because of defaults), the credit crisis will end.
- Requires the banks to actually reduce interest rates to some extent.
- In order to drop the monthly payment of the borrower from 38% to 31% of income, the bank, with a subsidy from the federal government, must actually reduce interest rates on the loan. Notably, this is different from the requirement that the bank reduce the monthly payment to 38% of the borrower's monthly income; to meet that requirement, the bank can simply extend the period of the principal payments over 40 years rather than 30 years. To meet the requirement that the bank reduce monthly payments to only 31% of the loan, the bank must actually reduce interest rates on the loan. I think there is a universal feeling that banks screwed up in the past few years, and to the extent that the second requirement of interest rate reductions makes them pay, I like it.
- Gives the borrowers an incentive to remain current on their modified mortgage
- Borrowers are given interest rate reductions as noted above and principal reductions if they remain current. To the extent that borrowers have a small amount of negative equity in their home, this should end that plague. Not only is their principal reduced, but as home prices rise, these borrowers will again have a positive equity in their home
- Targets the right people
- I like how it targets delinquent borrowers and those that are at imminent risk of default. This is going to the core of the problem. I also like how there is a greater incentive to modify before default as compared to in default.
I generally don't like the idea of government subsidies, but we're obviously going to have some type here, and these aren't that bad. I realize that the plan will only help homeowners who have a monthly payment that is close to 38% of their monthly income; banks will not attempt to modify loans of borrowers who have lost a substantial portion of their income or who are now unemployed. That makes sense; we're not looking to have the government or banks save everyone. For those whose loans are not modified and are required to foreclose, yes, that will suck. I'm truly sorry, but we can't save everyone. I wish I could find more things about this plan I don't like, but I think its a great idea. I'm sure there are things I haven't thought of, and if you can think of some, post a comment please.
SECOND
Some quick facts about the plan for current loans:
- With respect to those borrowers who are still current on their payments but have little or no equity in their home, the government will offer a method to refinance your loan with today's low interest rates.
- This feature will only be available for those whose loans were already owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. That means that this would part of Obama's plan would only help people who bought homes and borrowed only 80% of the purchase price; it wouldn't help people who borrowed 100% of the purchase price.
I like the idea of helping responsible homeowners, and to the extent that this plan only helps people who borrowed what they thought they could afford (80% of the purchase price), I like it. But I have more worries about this part of the plan than other parts. First, what happens if I purchased a home and paid 20% down, but Freddie or Fannie didn't buy or guarantee my mortgage? Why should I not be eligible for a cheap refinance simply because the government chose not to buy my mortgage? Or does the government own/guarantee all qualifying mortgages, making my objection moot?
Second, I'm not so sure that people who borrowed only 80% of the purchase price of their home really were that responsible. They may have saved up 20% of the price, but should have realized they would have had trouble meeting the mortgage payments after purchasing the home. For example, suppose Edward saved up 20k and bought a 100k home, with monthly payments of 1500 for 30 years. Lets say his monthly salary was also only 1800 a month; should we really give help him out? Shouldn't he have known he was going to be underwater almost immediately? This objection may be mitigated though, by the notion that Edward has probably already lost his house.
THIRD
Finally, I'd like to briefly comment on the idea of bankruptcy judges cramming down new loan terms in bankruptcy. Supposedly, this is the stick with which the Obama administration will attempt to get lenders to agree to modify loans. Just a quick comment - don't most foreclosures happen outside of bankruptcy? That is, doesn't the borrower just walk away from the house and the lender get it? If so, then a cram down feature may not help unless it gives the borrower leverage to threaten bankruptcy unless the bank modifies the loan. To this extent, I'm not so sure how genuine a threat this is. Bankruptcy will forever tarnish the credit ratings of a borrower, and throw any other loan he has into default as well. I need to think this feature out more, and so I'm holding writing more about this. Also, I've been reading and typing for about an hour now, and should have better things to do.

